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Is the Deadweight Actually Dead? Real Option Value
and Taxation of Oil and Gas
Adi Libson
And both that morning equally lay / In leaves no step had trodden black/
Oh, I kept the first for another day!
-Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, 1916

ABSTRACT
Analysis of tax policy overlooks an important element—the real option
value of the tax. If a tax causes a company to defer an activity with a high
probability that the activity will occur in the future when its costs are lower, the
tax will provide an economic benefit. Taking into account this real option value
will have a substantial impact on one of the key issues shaping tax policy—the
analysis of the deadweight loss caused by a given tax. This Article will focus on
the taxation of oil and gas, an area where real option value is especially
relevant. The Article shows that the optimal tax rate on oil and gas should be
higher than under conventional analysis. The Article also sheds light on how
this observation about the deadweight loss of taxation is connected to two
developing strands in legal scholarship: increasing attentiveness to real option
value, and incorporation of dynamic economic analysis into legal policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most taxes prevent some economic activity from occurring. This
effect is viewed solely as a negative effect of taxation,1 and given an
appropriate label—”the deadweight loss of taxation.” In this Article I
expose how this effect is not necessarily as negative as it would first
seem. Preventing an economic activity from taking place may have an
inconspicuous positive effect: the possibility that the economic activity
will take place in the future under better conditions. I will refer to this
beneficial deferral of economic activity as “real option value.” A “real
option” in this context is the company’s ability to control whether to
engage in an economic activity now or defer that activity to the future.
The term “real option value” was coined by the economists Avinash
Dixit and Robert Pindyck, and refers to the value of the ability to wait
with an irreversible investment decision due to the expectancy that
better information will be obtained in the future.2
This observation regarding the value that stems from postponing
an investment decision has significant legal policy implications.
Although real option value is relevant to the analysis of tax policy in
general, it is especially important to the taxation of natural resources,
and particularly to the taxation of oil and gas extractions. The constant
decrease in the extraction costs of these resources as a result of
technological innovation. The expectancy of such a future decrease
in costs endows the real option with significant positive value. This
Article will thus focus on the taxation of oil and gas, for which there is
extensive data showing a constant decrease in costs, but it may equally
apply to other types of natural resources.

1

By “taxation” here I mean taxes aimed at revenue raising. In the case of taxes
with a regulatory goal, preventing an activity from occurring is not necessarily a
negative effect of a tax; it might be the tax’s primary objective. Regarding these two
distinctive functions of taxation, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation,
60 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (2006).
2
AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 6
(1994).
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I will illustrate this point through a numerical example. Suppose
that in the state of Resourcia certain indications of oil deposits have
been discovered. As a result, the government decides that it is time to
determine the proper tax rate on revenue from oil fields to ensure that
the state benefits from these discoveries. The government is facing a
choice between two tax regimes: in one there is a 50% tax rate, and in
the other there is an 80% tax rate. There are two potential oil fields—
Field A and Field B. In Field A there is a 90% chance of yielding a net
value $800 million; exploring, developing, and producing the oil is
projected to cost $50 million. In Field B there is a 50% chance of
yielding a net value of $1 billion, and the investment needed to
explore, develop, and produce the oil is estimated at $220 million. All
of the prospective oil companies are large risk-neutral corporations.
Under a 50% tax rate regime on profits, the companies will explore
both fields because both have positive expected net value. The
expected net value of Field A under such a tax regime is $355 million:
(0.9*0.5*800) – (0.1*50)
And the expected net value of Field B under such a tax regime is
$140 million:
(0.5*0.5*1,000) – (0.5*220)
In contrast, under an 80% tax rate, while Field A will still be
exploited due to its positive value of $139 million:
(0.9*0.2*800) – (0.1*50)
Field B will not be exploited, due to its negative expected value of
$10 million:
(0.5*0.2*1,000) – (0.5*220)
The effect of the 80% tax rate on the non-exploration of Field B is the
tax’s deadweight loss. The consequence of such a tax system is that
society loses out on a beneficial economic activity that would have
generated an expected net social value of $390 million. Thus the
“price” the government is facing for collecting additional expected
revenue of $366 million under an 80% rate tax (in comparison to a
50% tax rate)3 is a social cost of $390 million in deadweight loss.
Resourcia’s government has two options if it is not willing to bear such
costs in exchange for the additional revenue. The first option would
be to opt for an alternative tax mechanism capable of raising the same
3

Under an 80% tax rate the government’s take increases to $976 million, from
$610 million under a 50% tax rate. See infra Table 1. I assume in this example that
the companies’ losses, in the event no oil is discovered, are not deductible—i.e. that
this is the only project the companies are running in the country, or that all other
projects are losing money and the companies have no profits to deduct from, thus
there is no loss for the government in case no oil is discovered. See infra Part VII.B.
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revenue with less deadweight loss. The second would be to decide that
the public goods it intends to provide with the extra $366 million are
not worth the cost, and thus reduce the amount of public goods
accordingly. Table 1 summarizes this example. All figures are in
millions of dollars.
Table 1
Net Profits Net Profits Government
Deadweight
from Field from Field Take
Loss
A
B
50% tax 355
140
610
0
rate
80% tax 571
(10)
976
390
rate
In this Article I will argue that the actual deadweight loss is,
counterintuitively, lower than in the calculations above. As a result, it
is possible that Resourcia should still opt for the 80% tax rate, even if
there is an alternative tax mechanism that can raise the additional
revenue with a deadweight loss lower than $366 million.
Current analysis of the effect of taxation on gas and oil production
overestimates the deadweight loss of taxation. As a result, it prescribes
suboptimal tax rates on gas and oil production. Specifically,
conventional analysis does not fully take into account the strong
possibility of a reduction in the costs of exploration, development, and
production of oil and gas that stems from technological progress. Such
technological advances, however, have a significant impact on the
deadweight loss of taxation for oil and gas. Even if in the short run a
given tax rate might prevent additional explorations, discoveries, and
production, in the medium run there is a high likelihood that the
exploration and production will still take place. The expected
reduction in exploration and production costs due to technological
innovation will turn such explorations into profitable activities even
under the higher tax rate. The value that such an expectation
generates—the opportunity to explore, develop, and produce gas and
oil in the future, when the activity will probably be more valuable even
if it is not profitable in the present—is what I label “real option value.”
In the example above, taking into account a 20% probability that
the costs will decrease by 60% in the future changes the picture. Even
if in the short run—t1—Field B will not be developed, there is a 20%
chance that it would be developed in the medium run—t2. Under such
a scenario there will still be deadweight loss from postposing the
production due to the time value of resources: possessing the resources
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later in t2 is worth less than having them now in t1. There will, however,
also be a surplus from waiting to develop due to the reduction in costs.4
The actual social value of such a scenario depends on the relationship
between the discount rate of the future value of the resources and the
rate of the reduction in cost. Let us assume that, due to the time value
of resources, the present value of the resources extracted in t2 would
be 10% lower than in t1, but that the costs would decrease by 60%.
Under such a scenario, the value of exploration of Field A in t2 would
be $69.2 million, and it would be explored:
0.2*0.5*(1000+0.6*220) – 0.5*0.4*220
The term on the left side is the expected benefit from the
exploration: a 50% probability that the $1.132 billion net value of
resources would be discovered in t2, multiplied by the after-tax profits
(0.2). The net value has increased from $1 billion because of the 60%
decrease in costs. The term on the right is the expected cost, which
would constitute only 40% of the costs of exploration in t1. The overall
deadweight loss of the 80% tax would decrease to $297 million when
taking into account the real option value of production in t2:
0.8*390 – 0.2*(132-50)*10/11
The term on the left is the expected deadweight loss if the
technological innovation does not take place. The term on the right
is the expected surplus if the technological innovation does take place.
The reason for the minus sign is that if the technological innovation
does take place, postponing production to t2 generates a surplus and
thus reduces the deadweight. While postponing production decreases
costs by $132 million (0.6*220), it decreases by $50 million the
expected value due to the time value of resources (500*0.1). In order
to convert this net surplus from postponing production and reducing
future costs to present value terms, the expression is multiplied by 10/
11.
The decrease in the deadweight loss by $97 million might turn the
80% tax rate to an attractive tax regime. Let us assume that the
deadweight loss of the alternative tax mechanism for raising the same
revenue is $320 million. Under the traditional analysis of deadweight
loss, an 80% tax would seem inefficient: it would have generated a
higher deadweight loss for the same revenue. In contrast, under the
analysis that took into account the real option value of not developing
the tract in t1, the 80% tax seems efficient: the assessed deadweight loss
4

This possibility is not essential for the argument of the Article; it is sufficient
that real option value will reduce the deadweight loss. It does not require that
production in the future will be of higher value than production in the present. For
a discussion regarding the likelihood of such a possibility, see infra Part IV.
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is lower than that of an alternative tax mechanism. This would be true
for any alternative tax mechanism with a deadweight loss between $297
and $390 million. While under the traditional analysis an 80% tax rate
on gas and oil would be inefficient compared to such alternatives,
under the analysis that takes into account the real option value
generated by the tax, such rates would seem efficient.
The real option value that a tax generates stems from adding a
dynamic element into the economic analysis of the effect of a tax, in
contrast to the static economic analysis that underlies the conventional
account of deadweight loss. The dynamic analysis is more sensitive to
how the exogenous economic circumstances evolve over time, and
reveals that the deadweight loss of the tax is coupled with a possible
benefit—the possibility that the economic activity that the tax prevents
in the present will take place in future. In a world without the tax, the
economic activity would have taken place in the present and thus the
option of producing the oil at lower cost would not exist.
Part I of this Article lays out the legal framework for taxation of
oil and gas, and the processes and considerations of government
agencies that determine the appropriate tax rate. Part II presents the
general concept of real option value and its relevance to oil and gas
taxation. Part III of this Article demonstrates how real option value fits
into the basic economic model by which the optimal tax rate on oil
and gas should be determined. Part IV substantiates the claim that
there is a strong probability of a future decrease in the cost of
exploration and production in the oil and gas sectors. Part V attempts
to provide an account for why real option value has been overlooked.
Part VI discusses several potential problems with my argument: the
possibility of realizing the real option value of exploration in the
present, the possibility of setting up an oil and gas tax regime with no
deadweight loss, and the possibility of the forecasts for future decreases
in costs being erroneous. I conclude the Article by arguing that even
though there are significant caveats in the analysis presented in this
paper, taking the dynamic element of real option value into account is
preferable to the current static approach.
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II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE OF GAS AND OIL TAXATION
In the United States, taxes on oil and gas extraction activity consist
of the standard corporate tax5 in addition to royalties, rents, and
“bonus bids”—the lump sum payment companies make in an auction
for leasing a particular tract.6 The royalty rate differs between offshore
tracts and onshore tracts. Offshore extractions are taxed at a rate of
18.75%, while onshore extractions are taxed at a rate of 12.5%. The
reason for this difference is not economic, but legal. The statute
providing the Secretary of Interior with authority to set the royalty rate
on offshore leases is the Outer Continental Shelf Act,7 which provides
the Secretary flexibility in setting the rate. In contrast, the rate for
onshore extractions is controlled by the Mineral Leasing Act, which
requires that the rate be set by Department of the Interior regulations.8
Revising regulations is a much more complex task, and thus the
Secretary of Interior has less flexibility in determining the rate for
onshore extractions.9
The revenue the government collected from these direct
payments for development of resources reached $9.7 billion in 2012.
The lion’s share of this revenue—87%—stemmed from royalties ($8.5
billion). Bonus bids are the source of 10% of this sum ($946 million)
and rental fees are the source of 3% of this sum ($273 million).10 While
this overall sum seems like a significant source of revenue, it is only a
small portion of the revenue companies have received from the sale of
5

Unlike most other OECD countries, there is no special tax rate in the United
States for profits from natural resources. Such profits are taxed at the same rate as
other sources of income: up to 35% of corporate profits and 39.6% of profits of
individuals and pass-through entities. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 11(b)(d), 1(a)(2) (2014). The
effective tax rate is even lower than the standard tax rate on revenues. The tax code
provides generous rules for expensing and deducting expenses incurred in the
production of natural resources, such as the percentage depletion allowance that
enables gas and oil producers to deduct 15% of their gross income. As a result the
cumulative depletion could exceed the amount of capital the taxpayer spent on
acquiring the property. See 26 U.S.C. § 613 (2014).
6
43 C.F.R. § 3120.1-1 (1988).
7
43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2014).
8
30 U.S.C. § 181 (2014).
9
The Secretary of the Interior is in the process of increasing the royalty rate for
onshore extractions. In response to a report of the Government Accountability Office,
which recommended increasing the royalty rate for onshore extractions, the
Department of the Interior claimed that such a change in regulation would take a long
period of time due to the requirement of going through notice-and-comment
rulemaking, which takes one to two years. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-14-50, OIL AND GAS RESOURCES: ACTION NEEDED FOR INTERIOR TO BETTER ENSURE
A FAIR RETURN 17–18 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 660/659515.pdf.
10
Reported Revenues by Category for FY2012, OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE,
available at http://statistics.onrr.gov/ReportTool.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
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oil and gas produced from federal land and waters, which was $66
billion.11 The amount of revenue raised, and the proportions provided
by the different sources of income, have remained more or less
constant since 2005 with the exception of FY 2008. Due to a staggering
increase in energy prices the revenue doubled in 2008, and the
amount raised from bonus bids jumped from the multi-year average of
10% of the total revenue to over 50% of the total revenue ($9 billion).12
The Government Accountability Office has already criticized the
suboptimal taxation of gas and oil extractions. In its 2007 report it
pointed out that the overall government take—the aggregation of all
forms of taxes and royalties that apply to gas and oil producers—from
federal waters such as the Gulf of Mexico is approximately 41–45%.13
This rate of government take is one of the lowest in the world,14 much
lower than Norway with a government take of 76%,15 and even lower
than the United Kingdom with a government take of 52%.16 Since the
report the government take has increased, due to an increase in
royalties on offshore extractions by 6.25% (from 12.5% to 18.75%).
But according to recent OECD data the U.S. government take from
deep-water oil extractions is only 51%, still far below Norway which has
remained around the same level—75% and even the United Kingdom
with a 51.5% government take. The government take on extractions

11

Supra note 9, at 1.
Irena Agalliu, Comparative Assessment of the Federal Oil and Gas Fiscal System,
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT. 8 (2011), available at http://www.energy.senate.gov
/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=d174971c-4682-4d96-b194-a85fa2b86774.
13
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OIL AND GAS ROYALTIES: A COMPARISON OF
THE SHARE OF REVENUE RECEIVED FROM OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND OTHER RESOURCE OWNERS 4–5 (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/94953.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. In most states
there is an additional severance tax that applies to the net value of production and
ranges from 3% (Utah) to 15% (Alaska). For survey of tax rates in different states, see
Ujjayant Chakravorty, Shelby Gerking & Andrew Leach, State Tax Policy and Oil
Production: The Role of the Severance Tax and Credits for Drilling, in U.S. ENERGY TAX POLICY
305–37 (Gilbert E. Metcalf ed., 2009), available at http://www.americantax
policyinstitute.org/pdf/energy_conference/chakravorty-gerking-leach.pdf.
14
GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 4–5.
15
Id.
16
Id. It should be noted that although the GAO report is based on the summary
of four studies, which all have approximately the same numbers, Daniel Johnston
claims that in the case of the U.S. the government take is actually much higher, around
70%. According to Johnston, these studies do not take into account the price the U.S.
charges for leasing land, which is one of the highest in the world per-acre, and the
“bonus bid” mechanism through which the U.S. captures a substantial portion of the
rent of the production of natural resources and raises $65 billion in revenue. See
Daniel Johnston, Changing Fiscal Landscape, 1 J. WORLD ENERGY & BUS. 31, 49–50
(2008).
12
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from the shelf is higher, at around 57%.17 Given the economic
attractiveness of the American fields, due to their proximity to the
American market and the relatively low expenses for the mobilization
of the extracted resources, the U.S. government take still seems far too
low.18
The discussion between the different agencies on the optimal
royalty rate is especially interesting, because it reveals the on-theground reasoning behind the rate. It stands in contrast to political
decisions regarding the income or corporate tax rate. Because these
decisions are made by Congress and not by executive agencies, the
outcome is primarily a factor of political economy considerations, and
is not expected to mirror optimal tax policy. In the case of royalties in
which an executive agency is in charge of deciding the rate, optimal
tax policy considerations dominate the process, along with other
“pure” policy considerations such as environmental and distributive
effects. While legal scholarship demonstrates how even governmental
agencies could be captured by private interests,19 governmental
agencies are relatively more insulated than the legislature from such

17

OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: NEW ZEALAND 2013, AVERAGE GOVERNMENT TAKE IN
OIL AND GAS FISCAL REGIMES 31 (2013), available at http://www.keepeek.com/DigitalAsset-Management/oecd/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-new-zealand-2013/
average-government-take-in-oil-and-gas-fiscal-regimes_eco_surveys-nzl-2013-graph21en#page1 (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). This increase seems to be part of a general trend
in those years in which many other countries also increased the government take after
energy prices peaked in 2008. The trend has reversed in many of the countries after
the deep decline in energy prices after 2008. See Agalliu, supra note 12.
18
GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 7.
19
For a description of the ascendance of “capture theory,” and the transition from
the belief that executive agencies are the “transmission belt for implementing
legislative directive” to the belief that agencies are dominated by the regulated
industries, see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1675 (1975). For an overview of more modern versions of “capture
theories,” see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285 (2006) (describing a shift in the
conceptualization of capture, from a focus on the pressure of regulated industries on
committee members overlooking the agency to cooperation with the agency in
providing it with information and guidance). The growing awareness of agencies’
inclination to be “captured” by interests of regulated industries brought legal scholars
to focus on the means by which agencies could be protected from capture, especially
their independence from the political sphere. See Paul Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits
of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 259–60 (1988); Marshal Berger & Gary J.
Edles, Establishing the Practice; The Theory and Operation of Independent agencies, 52 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2000); Daryl Levinson & Richard Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2376–77 (2006); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So
Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 459 (2008); Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010).
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interests.20
When observing the considerations both the Department of the
Interior and the Government Accountability Office are taking into
account, one finds that they primarily focus on the revenue forgone
due to the decrease in the amount of leases as a result of an increase
in the royalty rate. They balance this loss against the increase in
revenue from the remaining leases. The decrease in the amount of
leases is what is labeled in economic jargon as the tax’s “deadweight
loss.”
These considerations are reflected both in the reports of these
governmental agencies and their internal discussions.
The
Governmental Accountability Office report mainly focuses on the
comparison of the U.S. government take from oil and gas extractions
to those of other countries. The report makes reference to the
considerations that the DOI’s representatives have raised in
determining the royalty rate, which centered on balancing between
increasing revenue on the one hand and decreasing output on the
other. The decrease in output is referred to as a “net-cost” of raising
the royalty rate:
Interior’s analysis included estimates for increasing royalty
rates beyond 18.75 percent. Specifically, it estimated that
royalty rate increases from 18.75 to 21.875 percent would
cause production losses of 2 to 6 percent with royalty revenue
increases of 11 to 17 percent. According to the analysis, the
effect of increased royalty rates, depending on the size of the
change, would be less production, but with the potential for
higher revenues from royalties in the future. Interior found
that a large increase in the royalty rate could curtail expected
returns to lessees to such a large extent that it might unduly
reduce leasing and future production by proportions greater
than suggested in its analysis. Much higher royalty rates
could also curtail production from new leases in the future
as production declines in the later phases of a lease’s
productive life.21
The decrease in output as a result of the increase in the royalty rate is
referred to as a “loss.” There is no discussion regarding the possible
20

See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 55–63 (1982) (claiming that delegation from legislators to professional bureaucratic
officials stems from strategic efforts to “duck” decisions that would displease interests
groups); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91–95 (1985) (arguing that delegating political
decisions to the expertise of bureaucrats enables the legislature to get “more policy
bang for its legislative buck”).
21
Supra note 9, at n.26.
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economic upsides of a decrease in output.
A similar cost-benefit analysis by the Department of the Interior is
also reflected in its analysis of an increase in the rental rates of tracts.
The DOI juxtaposes the increase in revenue with an approximation of
the number of tracts that would not be leased as a result of such an
increase (5 tracts), which is treated as a net loss.22 There is no mention
of the possible upside of postponing production that might curtail the
costs.
This approach is not limited to the brief description of the costbenefit analysis of the DOI in the GAO report. It is also reflected in
third party studies that the DOI has invited and on which its policy is
based. The DOI’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management has invited a
study from Economic Analysis, Inc. and the Marine Policy Center,
entitled “Policies to Affect the Pace of Leasing and Revenues in the
Gulf of Mexico.” This report has also not addressed the possible
upsides of decreasing the pace of leasing, aside from the
environmental advantages. It too has assumed that a decrease in
leasing will reduce revenues, without factoring in the possible impact
of technological progress on the cost of future extractions.23
My argument in this Article is that there is an additional factor
which is not taken at all into account in determining the optimal tax
rate or royalty rate on oil and gas extractions. This is the real option
value of extracting the resources in a later period. The main reason
that such an option has positive value is due to the strong likelihood
that the costs of extracting the resources will decrease significantly due
to technological progress. As I have demonstrated above, none of the
governmental agencies determining the royalty rate have taken this
factor into account in any way. In the next section, I will delineate what
the real option value is and how it relates to the economic analysis of
oil and gas taxation.
III. REAL OPTION VALUE AND OIL AND GAS TAXATION
The real option value in the natural resources sector is of
significant economic magnitude. In recent years many countries,
especially the United States, have discovered significant amounts of

22

Id. at 15.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, INC. & MARINE POLICY CENTER, FINAL REPORT: POLICIES TO
AFFECT THE PACE OF LEASING AND REVENUES IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, OCS STUDY
BOEMRE 2011-013, at 26 (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.boem.gov/BOEMNewsroom/Library/Publications/2011/2011-013-Part1.aspx.
23
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natural resource reserves, especially shale gas24 and shale oil.25 On the
one hand, the deficits in the national budgets of many of these
countries, in addition to the high energy prices in 2006–2008,
intensified their motivation to tax the extraction of these resources to
their highest ability.26 On the other hand, due to the increasing
likelihood that additional reserves might be discovered, these
countries wanted to avoid the deadweight effect of a tax on natural
resources: tax rates that might deter companies from further
exploration and production.27
Recent legal scholarship has raised awareness of option and real
option value. In many fields it has been claimed that the existence of
option value is overlooked and not taken into account by policymakers,
legislators, and legal scholars. Ian Ayres has discussed option value in
the context of legal entitlements in general.28 Joseph Grundfest and
Peter Huang use option value in the field of litigation behavior to
provide an account of why certain lawsuits aren’t settled as early as the
conventional model prescribes.29 In the field of bankruptcy, Douglas
Baird and Edward Morrison claim that the option value that

24

For projections of the future increase in production of shale gas, see infra notes
81–83 and accompanying text.
25
See Leonardo Maugeri, The Shale Oil Boom: A U.S. Phenomenon 1–10, 18–24, (The
Geopolitics of Energy Project—Harvard Kennedy Sch. Belfer Ctr., Discussion Paper
#2013-05,
2013),
available
at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
USShaleOilReport.pdf. Maugeri notes that in 2012 out of 6.44 mbd of crude oil, 1.14
(17.7%) is tight and shale crude oil. It is projected that by 2017 the tight and shale
crude oil will reach almost 50% of all crude oil produced—5 mbd, out of an increased
total of 10.4. See id. at 19. The reason why the technology of shale extraction had a
much greater impact in the United States than in other countries is primarily due to
the fact that shale extraction is highly drilling intensive, and 60% of rigs are located in
the U.S. In addition, in the U.S. most shale fields are not located in densely populated
areas. See id. at 1–2.
26
The United States has increased the royalties rate in the Gulf of Mexico in both
deepwater and the shelf (see supra Part II) and increased rental rates in 2009 from
$7.50 per acre to $11–$44 in deepwater, and from $5 to $7–$28 in the shelf, see Agalliu,
supra note 12 at 280. China introduced both a 74% windfall profit tax for when crude
oil prices exceed $40 per barrel, and a 5% export duty. Id. at 274. In 2007, India
increased the rate of the Minimum Alternate Tax from 7.5% of book profits to 10%.
Id. In 2006, the United Kingdom increased the rate of the special petroleum tax from
10% to 20%, and in 2011 it raised the rate to 32%. Id. at. 279–80.
27
Canada (Alberta) is a classic example of such a dynamic. In 2007 the
government increased royalties from 30% to 50%. Id. at 272. After a decline in drilling
activity it suspended the 2007 royalty framework and instated a lower royalty rate—up
to 40% on oil and 36% on gas. Id.
28
See generally IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS
(2005).
29
Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real
Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1275 (2006).
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accompanies chapter 11 bankruptcies incentivizes parties to withhold
information and thus makes chapter 11 less efficient than a mandatory
auction.30 Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner use option value to shed light
on the undervaluation of the timing of legislation and regulation in
the fields of administrative law and legislation.31 Lee-Anne Fennel
suggests using self-made options to mitigate the problem of unknown
subjective valuation in the context of liability and property rights.32
Lynne Hold, Paul Sotkiewicz, and Sanford Berg utilize an option value
model to assess the uncertainty that a nuclear plant developer faces in
the field of risk regulation.33
The most relevant application of real option value to legal policy
to the one discussed in this Article is Michael Livermore’s study of real
option value in the context of the regulation of natural resources.34
Similarly to the point raised above, Livermore refers to the real option
value that accompanies non-exploration. Livermore concentrates on
the application of this point to the regulation of the allocation of lease
rights for exploration of natural resources through auctions.35 His
main argument is that the government does not internalize the option
value that accompanies non-exploration, and as a consequence sets the
lease price for exploring fields too low.36 While Livermore does touch
on the real option value that stems from uncertainty regarding
extraction costs, he primarily focuses on the environmental social cost
as a source of real option value.37 Furthermore, Livermore emphasizes
the real option value of reducing uncertainty by waiting. In this
Article, I do not claim that waiting generates real option value per se;
real option value exists when there is a positive expectation of an
increase in value, otherwise waiting might generate negative real option

30

Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 356, 358–66 (2001).
31
Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 543, 544 (2007).
32
See Lee-Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1402–07
(2005).
33
See Lynne Holt, Paul Sotkiewicz & Sanford Berg, (When) to Build or Not to Build?:
The Role of Uncertainty in Nuclear Power Expansion, 3 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 174
(2008).
34
See Michael A. Livermore, Patience is an Economic Virtue: Real Options, Natural
Resources and Offshore Oil, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 581 (2013).
35
Id. at 585.
36
Id. at 585–86.
37
Id. at 605–13. Livermore touches technological development only briefly, as
one dimension among three that account for the uncertainty of deep-water ocean
drilling. The other dimension besides environmental and social costs is the price
dimension of the natural resource.
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value.38 In this Article, I explore the relevance of overlooking the real
option value of non-exploration to the analysis of taxation in general,
and to the royalty rate of oil and gas exploration in particular. In
addition, I will elaborate in Part III39 on the main source of the positive
option value that accompanies the non-exploitation of a field: the high
probability of future technological progress that will reduce the costs
of exploration, development, and production of oil and gas.
An additional study examining the application of real option
value to the legal context is Jeff Strnad’s study, which examines the
relevance of real option value to the context of natural resource
exploration and production and its impact on tax policy.40 Strnad’s
primary concern is finding the optimal tax mix within the natural
resources sector and reducing the distortionary effect of taxation on
the decision which projects are pursued in the natural resources
sector.41 However, Strnad overlooks the most significant effect of real
option value on the taxation of natural resources—its impact on the
overall deadweight loss of taxation, and as a consequence on the
optimal tax rate on natural resources. My goal in this Article is to
explore this significant feature of option value. In contrast to Strnad,
this Article does not go into internal questions of taxation on natural
resources such as the appropriate mechanism through which natural
resources should be taxed: royalties or taxation of the economic rent
through a tax on profits. Rather, it is concerned only with the overall
government take (GT) from revenues stemming from natural
resources, and not with the elements that comprise the GT.42 Strnad is
concerned with the “internal deadweight” effect resulting from the
structure of taxes on natural resources—their distortionary effect

38

I will demonstrate my critique that waiting does not per se generate real option
value by focusing on Livermore’s third dimension of uncertainty: price uncertainty.
Passing time doesn’t resolve the uncertainty concerning the price. We may have
information regarding the price in the period to which we postponed exploration, but
we have added uncertainty concerning the price in the additional unit of time that has
become relevant due to the postponement of the exploration (e.g., if we have
postponed production from 1990 to 1991, and the price that is economically relevant
is the price in the subsequent 20 years after the time of exploration, we may have
information regarding the price in 1991 that we wouldn’t have if we didn’t postpone
production, but we have added uncertainty regarding the price in 2021 that would
have been irrelevant if we had not postponed production).
39
See infra Part V.
40
Jeff Strnad, Taxes and Nonrenewable Resources: The Impact on Exploration and
Development, 55 SMU L. REV. 1683 (2002).
41
See id. at 1686–91.
42
See Johnston, supra note 16, at 38–39 (discussing a comparative study of
government take from oil profits in different countries).
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within the natural resources sector.43 In contrast, the concern in this
Article is with the “external deadweight” effect of taxes—the
distortionary effect of taxes on the levels of economic activity in the
market as a whole; the mix between the taxation on natural resources
and other sources of revenue. This, of course, depends on the analysis
of the deadweight loss of taxes on natural resources in comparison to
the deadweight loss of other forms of taxation.
This Article will also shed light on how the neglect of real option
value is connected to a more general problem in legal scholarship: it
is too focused on static economic analysis and overlooks significant
implications that stem from dynamic elements.44
Deadweight loss is one of the central considerations in designing
an efficient tax mechanism, and analysis of deadweight loss has
generated many implications for tax law. In their argument for a
consumption tax, Bankman and Weisbach have emphasized the
importance of levying taxes on goods with low elasticity rather than
goods with high elasticity. The effect of taxes on behavior is weaker
for low elasticity goods, and as a result the deadweight loss is more
limited.45 Terrence R. Chovart has justified imposing a second tax on
corporate income by arguing that it triggers a weak response and, thus,
has a minimal deadweight effect.46 Daniel Shaviro has argued that
rules identifying the realization of income should bend toward
realization in cases of inelastic transactions to minimize deadweight
loss.47 In the same vein, Deborah Schenck has illuminated the effect
of realization rules on marginal income elasticity, and how realization
rules that decrease income elasticity reduce the deadweight loss of
taxes.48 David Schizer has claimed that to minimize deadweight loss,
the tax system should discriminate between actors with inelastic
preferences and actors with elastic preferences.49 In this Article, I
address the computation of the deadweight loss of a tax, and expose
how the conventional analysis of deadweight loss misses a significant
43

See Strnad, supra note 40. Strnad’s main concern is with whether a given tax
meddles with the pre-tax ranking of projects to be pursued.
44
See infra Part 0
45
See Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption
Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1420 n.10 (2006).
46
Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 239, 255 (2003).
47
Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under
the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 4 (1992).
48
Deborah H. Schenk, An Efficiency Approach to Reforming A Realization-Based Tax,
57 TAX L. REV. 503, 504–07 (2004).
49
David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax
Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1353 n.47 (2000).
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element that may decrease the estimated overall deadweight loss. One
of the main implications of this analysis is that the tax rate on natural
resources should be higher than it normally is under the conventional
analysis and, thus, that taxes on natural resources should be a more
significant element in the general tax mix.
Needless to say, tax policy is guided not just by efficiency
considerations, but also by political and fairness considerations.50
While in many cases concerns over efficiency considerations run
counter to these other considerations, perhaps fairness in particular,51
the efficiency consideration of taking real option value into account
actually furthers fairness considerations. One of the most common
fairness claims is that states should increase tax rates on natural
resources because resources belong to the public at large and, thus,
the public should be the primary beneficiary of any revenue generated.
The state’s claim to its resources is based on its “birthright to the
natural heritage of the state.”52 Taking real option value into account
thus furthers the goal of fairness by increasing the tax rate on revenues
generated from the production of natural resources.
IV. FITTING REAL OPTION VALUE INTO THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION
In general, optimal taxation is defined by the tax allocation that
minimizes the deadweight loss of taxation, given the amount of
revenue that the government is interested in collecting and its
distributive choices.53 The deadweight loss of a tax is a computation of
a tax’s social cost due to its distortionary effect on taxpayers, who alter
their behavior in response to the tax and so eliminate mutually
beneficial transactions that would occur in a tax-free world.54 The
deadweight loss thus equals the total surplus the two sides would have
incurred from the transactions that did not take place due to the tax
imposed.

50

LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 3–4 (2002).
See, e.g., Barbara Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L.
REV. 157, 168 (arguing that scholars supporting proportionate taxation on fairness
grounds pay a price in terms of efficiency because proportionate taxes are not an
optimal pricing solution for public goods).
52
See Walter Hellerstein, Political Perspectives on the State and Local Taxation of
Natural Resources, 19 GA. L. REV. 31, 34 (1984).
53
See Agnar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation: An Introduction to the Literature, 6 J. PUB.
ECON. 37 (1976).
54
See Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in 1
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 61, 67 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds.,
1985).
51
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The existence of deadweight loss in and of itself does not mean
that the tax is inefficient. Almost all taxes cause some deadweight loss.
The tax is inefficient only if the same amount of revenue could have
been raised through an alternative tax mechanism with a lower
deadweight loss effect.55 Thus, in order to fully determine whether a
certain tax is optimal, one has to know the deadweight loss of an
alternative tax that would raise the same revenue. The first step for
determining the optimal tax rate is assessing the deadweight loss it
creates in absolute terms.
In order to estimate deadweight loss of a tax in the case of natural
resources, one must estimate the effect of the tax on the value of the
expected profile of extractions. This is one of the uses of the Hotelling
Rule. According to the Hotelling Rule, framed by Professor Harold
Hotelling, the optimal extraction of a resource will be determined
such that the market return on the resource will equal the market
return on an alternative investment.56 If the expected return on the
extraction of a marginal resource unit is below the market rate of
return on alternative investments, the owner of the resource will prefer
to invest the cost of extracting that unit in alternative investments
where the return will be higher.
For example, assume the cost of extracting a given unit of a
natural resource is $5, and the unit could be sold for $5.20 one year
after making the initial investment. Assume the individual could buy
a bond that would pay him a 5% interest with the same level of risk as
in the extraction activity. Under such circumstances, the individual
will not extract the extra unit—she will prefer to invest her money in
the bond rather than investing it in extracting the marginal resource
unit. While her returns for investing the $5 on the extraction of
resources will be $0.20, her returns on investing in the bond will be
greater: $0.25. For the previous resource units it may have been
profitable for the individual to invest in extraction, since the cost
function is increasing to scale and their extraction costs were lower
and, thus, provided a higher return for the investment than for the
bond. She will, however, extract that additional marginal resource unit
only in the future, when the costs of extracting the marginal unit will
be lower.

55

See Sandmo, supra note 53.
See generally H. Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON.
137 (1931).
56

LIBSON (DO NOT DELETE)

850

6/22/2015 5:26 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:833

Given that natural resource stocks are much greater than the
amount of natural resources extracted in equilibrium,57 the Hotelling
Rule predicts that the price of natural resources will increase at the
same rate as the standard market rate of returns on alternative
investments. Given a certain stock of resources, the deadweight loss of
taxes on natural investments could be calculated by solving the
following equation:58
,

,
- Tpv

DWs stands for the deadweight loss in the value of a given stock from
the imposition of a tax. B(qt) denotes the benefit from the extraction
of quantity q of the resource in period t. C(qt, St) is the cost of
extracting quantity q in period t, out of the given stock S. Ctax(qt,st) is
the cost of extracting quantity q in period t including the tax, r is the
discount rate based on the market’s rate of return on riskless
investments, and Et is the expectation of the value (denoted by V) of
the stocks remaining in period t+1.59 Tpv is the present value of the tax
payments that would be paid on the production of resources from the
stockpile.
According to this equation, the deadweight loss of a tax on a
natural resource equals the difference between the pre-tax present
value of the profile of extractions and the post-tax present value of the
profile of extractions minus the taxes collected.
The problem is that the estimation of the overall deadweight loss
caused by a tax on natural resources does not end here. There is an
additional element that complicates the calculation of the deadweight
loss in the case of natural resources. The deadweight loss is not
57

This is due to the discovery of new deposits. See Jeffrey A. Krautkraemer,
Nonrenewable Resource Scarcity, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 2065, 2102 (1998).
58
This equation is based on one of the applications of the Hotelling Rule, noted
by Boadway & Keen. They derived from the Hotelling Rule the present value
attributed to a given resource stock, which is the expression in the parenthesis both
on the right and on the left of the minus symbol in the middle of the equation. From
this equation it is very simple to derive the tax’s deadweight loss regarding a given
resource. It is the present value of the extraction path in a tax-free world, minus the
present value of the extraction path given a tax, minus the present value of the taxes
collected by the government from the revenues of the resource. See R. Boadway & M.
Keen, Theoretical Perspectives on Resource Tax Design, in THE TAXATION OF PETROLEUM AND
MINERALS PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND PRACTICE 26 (Philip Daniel & Michael Keen eds.,
2010).
59
This equation is recursive—value of the stock in time t could be determined
only after determining the value of the stock in time t+1.
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comprised only of the effect of altering the optimal extraction profile
of a given stock referred to above. In addition, the tax on natural
resources will diminish the amount of new stocks discovered by
exploration, further increasing the deadweight of the tax. As
explained above, the tax lowers the net profits a firm will receive from
discovering a new stockpile of natural resources, and as a result there
will be a lower incentive to execute explorations. This is because the
lower expected returns may not compensate the firm for the risk
involved in the explorations. The Hotelling rule was devised to
estimate the optimal extraction path of a given resource. But the
deadweight loss of taxes on natural resources is not comprised only of
the distortion of the extraction path of a given stockpile. A central
element of the deadweight loss is the effect of the tax on whether new
stockpiles of natural resources are discovered. As stated above, such
an effect will occur even if there is no tax on the exploration phase.
Even if the firm is taxed on its rents from production, ex ante it will see
a lower level of post-tax net profits. The lower level of net profits will
lower its incentive to explore new areas for resources. Surprisingly,
there is no formal economic model for estimating the deadweight loss
caused by taxation on the discovery of additional stockpiles of natural
resources.
The absence of a formal model that takes into account the
complexities of the relationship between taxation and discovery of
additional stockpiles may seriously distort any attempt to assess the
deadweight effect of taxes on natural resources. One of the central
problems with assessing the deadweight loss of taxes due to eliminating
the discovery of additional stockpiles is that one can never be certain
regarding the quantity of stockpiles that haven’t been discovered.
After all, we simply cannot know whether they exist. Although we have
no perfect knowledge of the existence of such stockpiles, we do have
partial information regarding the expectation that certain stockpiles
may be found in certain areas.
If taxation at a certain rate would prevent us from discovering
additional stockpiles, the deadweight loss should not equal the full
value of the stockpile—the discovery has only increased the subjective
likelihood that the stockpile exists. The high likelihood of finding a
stockpile does not disappear if a certain tax regime makes it
unprofitable to explore whether the stockpile actually exists. Similarly,
the value of the expectation of finding a stockpile in a certain location
does not disappear even if an exploration to find the stockpile is not
pursued. The value of such a stockpile is essentially an option to invest
X dollars for a probability P to find the value of Y in natural resources.
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In other words, the value of the option to explore in the future whether
there is a stockpile of natural resources in a certain site (denoted by
On) could be described by the following equation:
On=P*Y-X
It is true that this option is worthless if at the expiration date
X>P*Y. But it is not correct to deduce that if in the present X>P*Y, it
will always be true that X>P*Y. Even if a tax rate may lower the posttax value of Y, so that the value of P*Y is lower than the costs of
exploration, in a dynamic setting where the parameters fluctuate these
option may have positive value if P or Y increase or if X decreases.60
If there is no real reason to believe that any of these parameters
will change, the value of On will not be substantial and will be close to
0—the future value will not deviate substantially from the present value
of 0. This Article will argue that there are firm grounds to believe that
in the future the cost of X will substantially decrease. As a result, even
if in the present X>P*Y and, thus, no exploration will take place in
such a field, the option On is still valuable due to the strong likelihood
that in the future X will decrease. While there are strong grounds to
assume that P and Y will not change—both the probability of finding a
stockpile and the price and value of a resource incorporate
information of future changes—X might change substantially. The
expectancy of the change in X is based on the expectancy of
technological innovations in the future that would reduce the costs of
exploration and production. Thus when estimating the deadweight
loss of taxes on natural resources, the loss from the non-exploration of
the field should be reduced by the benefit of the option to explore the
field in the future.61

60

Volatility is a significant factor in determining the value of the option according
to the Black & Scholes formula for option valuation. See SHELDON NATENBERG, OPTION
VOLATILITY AND PRICING 51–69 (1994) (discussing the measurement of volatility and its
effect on the valuation of options).
61
The emphasis regarding the expectancy for reduction of cost may seem to stray
away from the theory of pure real option value presented by Dixit & Pindyck (supra. n.
2). Dixit and Pindyck emphasize the value of waiting per-se, without assuming an
expectancy for an increase in the value of the underlying asset. Yet also according to
Dixit & Pindyck the waiting has to generate a positive expectancy over a certain
threshold in order that it would justify postponing the investment (supra, at 136-37).
The fact that there is some expectancy for obtaining more information by waiting is
not sufficient for justifying the waiting. While the waiting generates the benefit of the
greater expectancy for valuable information, it also is accompanied by the cost of the
time value of resources that is lost by waiting with the investment. Obtaining the
product of the investment sooner has greater value than obtaining it later. Thus in
order for the waiting to have a net positive value, the value of the positive expectancy
the waiting generates has to surpass the time value of resources that is lost.
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I will clarify this point through a two period model—t1 and t2.
Graph 1 below describes the deadweight effect of a tax in t1. The pretax supply curve—S—rises as the price increases. The graph St signifies
the post-tax demand curve. The assumption behind the graph is that
the country in which production takes place is a small open economy
and, thus, the price that producers face is P*, the world price for each
unit of natural resources. Given the tax, the equilibrium shifts from
E1, in which the quantity of resources explored and produced will be
Q1, to E2, in which the quantity of resources explored and produced
will be Q2. The deadweight loss of the tax is represented by the striped
trapeze.
Graph 1 - Deadweight Loss of Tax on Natural
Resource in T1
St
P
S

P*

Q2

Q1

Q

The equilibrium in t2, given that technological improvements have
reduced costs of exploration and production, is path dependent on
whether a tax has been imposed at time t1, and is described in Graph
2 below. St1 signifies the basic supply curve given that a tax has been
levied in both t1 and t2. It is similar to the post-tax supply curve in t1;
besides its starting point, production is positive only when the price is
above P*. All the natural resource units for which the costs of
exploration and extraction were lower than P* have been extracted in
t1, assuming an increasing marginal cost function. The supply curve
S2—which applies to a scenario where there were no taxes in t1 and the
taxes have been introduced only in t2—looks a bit different. It is
located a bit higher than S1—quantity supplied under any price would
be lower than the quantity supplied under t1. The reason for this is
that the marginal units that would have been produced if the price was
a bit higher than P* under the S1 curve will not be produced under the
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supply curve S2. This is because those units have already been
discovered and produced in t1, when there were no taxes and the cost
the producer faced was lower. Thus, the quantity that will be supplied
under the supply function S1 in t2 will be lower than under the supply
function S2. The maximum gap between the two supply functions S’1
and S’2 for the quantity supplied given a certain price is the difference
between the production in t1 with no taxes and the production with
taxes.62 Below, Graph 2 illustrates the maximum possible gap between
S’1 and S’2. The difference in the quantities supplied under S’1 and S’2
(Q3-Q4) equals the difference between the quantities produced in t1
with taxes and the quantities produced in t1 without taxes. While the
difference between Q3 and Q4 could be smaller than the difference
between Q1 and Q2, it cannot be greater.
Graph 2 – Deadweight Loss of Tax on Natural Resource in T2
P

S1
S’2
S’1

S2
P*

Q4

Q3

Q

Q1-Q2

It should be noted that if there were no technological
improvements, no resource units would have been discovered and
produced—the reservation price both under S1 and S2 are higher than
the given world price of P*. The interesting result is that given
62

The gap cannot be higher than the gap between production with tax and
production without tax in t1, but could definitely be smaller. This depends on the
extent to which the costs of exploration are reduced by innovations in technology. If
the reduction of costs is less significant than shown in graph 2, then the supply curve
S’1 will move to the left, and thus the gap between S’1 and S’2 in the quantity of
production would be less than the gap between pre-tax and post-tax supply in t1.
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technological improvement, the taxes imposed in period t1 will
generate a surplus in t2 that is signified by the striped triangle.
Counterintuitively, in theory, the surplus in t2 might even exceed in the
deadweight loss in t1 and, thus, in total, the taxes imposed in t1 might
surprisingly generate an overall surplus. The reason for this
counterintuitive result is that the tax in t1 postpones exploration and
production of some of the units to t2, in which a significant amount of
units are produced for a lower cost.
It is important to emphasize that the argument of this Article is
not based on the assumption that the tax in t1 may generate a surplus
by postponing production to a period with lower costs. It is based on
a much weaker assertion: the deadweight is overestimated. The time
value of resources which is lost by postponing production might be
greater than the reduction in costs from technological improvement.
As discussed above, even if the tax still generates a deadweight loss
overall, the fact that it is smaller than estimated without taking the
option value into account can have the effect of turning a supposedly
inefficient tax into an efficient tax.
Even though the core argument in this Article does not require
that the tax generate an overall surplus, such a scenario deserves to be
discussed as an interesting possibility that stems from the analysis of real
option value. Even as a mere possibility, it raises the question: how can
it be theoretically possible that the tax generates a surplus? If
postponing exploration and production due to the lower expected
costs in the future generates a surplus, why wouldn’t the private firms
postpone exploration and production in order to maximize their
private profits in a tax-free world? The theoretical possibility that the
tax may generate a surplus relies on the assumption that private firms
would not necessarily capture the surplus by delaying exploration and
production anyway. Of course, this is a problematic assumption that is
not congruent with the assumption underlying classical economic
analysis that players will maximize their utility under the conditions of
a free market.
Even if there seems to be expected gains from postponing
production, there are three possible reasons why private firms would
not necessarily postpone exploration or production. The first is due
to the economic structure of the lease agreements for the exploration
of tracts. After making the highest “bonus bid” for a tract and receiving
the right to explore for oil and gas in the tract, firms still have to pay
rent on the tract. A bonus bid payment in the U.S. isn’t symbolic as in
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other countries: it has one of the highest rates per acre in the world.63
Thus, even if for a firm the expected value of producing the resources
in the future is higher, when factoring in the additional rent payments,
the overall expected value of producing in the present may be higher.
The firm can circumvent this cost by bidding for the tract only in the
future, but by then some other firm may have made a bid. Thus, the
firm will prefer making the bid in the present over making it in the
future when the expected gains will be higher—better to have one bird
in the hand than two in the bush.
This raises a separate question regarding the economic
desirability of the government policy of charging a rent on tracts. It
seems to cause an inefficient outcome, distorting the optimal
production pattern by incentivizing firms to produce in the present
when the expected gains from producing in the future are higher. Yet,
imposing rent payments may still be economically justifiable. Firstly,
having a right to explore a tract may generate negative externalities by
limiting the public usage of the tract. The rent payment may be a way
of internalizing this externality. This consideration is actually reflected
in the DOI’s reports, and is the central rationale behind the increase
in the rent payments.64
Secondly, the government may have an additional interest in
restricting the firm’s decision of when to produce after it has leased a
tract. The government has an interest in maintaining a national
stockpile of energy resources.65 Enabling firms that have leased tracts
to freely decide when to extract adds significant uncertainty in
assessing and controlling the amount of national energy resources.
Although even after leasing a certain quantity of tracts the government
does not know the potential production of the leases, enabling firms
to freely decide when to produce adds an additional dimension of
uncertainty and significantly increases the overall uncertainty over the
amount of resources that would be extracted in a given period.
Essentially, this source of uncertainty is also a negative externality that
the rent payments may internalize.

63

Johnston, supra note 16, at 50.
FINAL REPORT: POLICIES TO AFFECT THE PACE OF LEASING AND REVENUES IN THE
GULF OF MEXICO, supra note 23, at 9, 28.
65
See Paul N. Leiby, Estimating the Energy Security Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports,
OAK RIDGE NAT’L LABORATORY 3–4 (Feb. 2007), available at http://
www.epa.gov/otaq/renewablefuels/ornl-tm-2007-028.pdf (analyzing the benefits of
energy security).
64
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The second reason why a firm would not postpone production is
the time value of resources. Even if the cost would be lower if firms
postponed production to t2, the gains may not be sufficient to offset
the loss of the time value of resources they have lost by postponing
exploration and production to t2. Accordingly, it is not correct to
determine that, overall, non-exploration in t1 would generate a surplus.
When taking into account the firm’s time value of resources, imposing
the tax may result in a loss in present value terms. This difference
between the firm’s discount rate and the discount rate of social
institutions may result from the different time horizons with which
these entities are concerned. Social institutions have a more distant
time horizon, which studies have demonstrated is accompanied by a
lower discount rate. Private firms have a closer time horizon, which is
accompanied by a higher discount rate.66
The third answer is that even though there is an expected surplus
from postponing exploration and production to t2, private firms would
not postpone production due to risk aversion.67 A central source of
uncertainty for firms is government regulation. Private firms cannot
rely on the projections for taxation in t2, and thus even if the expected
cost reducing technology will materialize, they might still find
themselves with lower post-tax revenue in t2. The government is not
exposed to any risk in this respect, due to the fact that it controls the
decision. Besides regulatory uncertainty, firms may be risk averse in
response to the uncertainty of future innovations, and thus may prefer
the secure payoffs in t1 to the probabilistic higher payoffs in t2.
Governments may be less risk averse than private firms, and thus may
prefer the higher expected payoffs to the lower and secure payoffs
resulting from imposing a tax in t1.68
66

For experiments demonstrating the correlation between the distance of the
horizon and the discount rate, see S. Fredrick, G. Loewenstein & T. O’Donoghue, Time
Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351 (2002).
Regarding the view that the government’s discount rate should be lower than the
market’s discount rate, so that no generation is favored over the other, see Robert
Solow, The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 10
(1974) See also Tyler Cowen, Caring About the Distant Future: Why It Matters and What It
Means, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 5–6 (2007).
67
Even in publicly traded firms, in which the shareholders are risk neutral as a
result of the diversification of their portfolios, the managers who make the investment
decisions tend to be risk averse. See John Coffee Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (1986); John Coffee Jr., Systematic
Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond
Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 807 (2011).
68
Regarding government’s abilities to manage risk, see DAVID MOSS, WHEN
EVERYTHING ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 1–2 (2002);
compare BARBARA VIS, POLITICS OF RISK TAKING: WELFARE STATE REFORM IN ADVANCED
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Taking into account the real option value that a tax may generate
has a significant impact on the analysis of deadweight loss in particular
and tax policy in general, especially in cases for which there is a strong
expectancy for technological development. This Part has discussed
taxation of gas and oil as a classic case of the significant impact of real
option value. The next Part will substantiate the claim that there is a
strong expectancy for technological developments in the gas and oil
exploration and production sector that make it the classic example for
real option value.
V. SUBSTANTIATING THE STRONG EXPECTANCY FOR A REDUCTION IN
COSTS
While every tax may yield new possible scenarios for the future by
preventing some economic activity from taking place in the present,
the value of these new scenarios may be positive or negative. Without
additional information one cannot conclude whether the value of the
new set of possible scenarios is higher than the value of the possible
scenarios before the tax was imposed. For this reason, they are
disregarded in the economic analysis of taxation. In the case of
taxation of gas and oil, there are firm grounds to believe that the value
of the new set of possible scenarios is significantly higher than the value
of the scenarios in which the tax hasn’t been imposed. The reason for
this is the strong expectancy that significant technological
developments will occur in the near future which will reduce
substantially the cost of extracting gas and oil from a given tract. In
this Part I will provide the reasons for the strong expectancy of
significant reduction in costs.
One of the primary indications of future reductions in the cost of
extraction of gas and oil resulting from technological developments is
the projection of the U.S. Energy Information Agency through its
National Energy Modeling System (Graph 3). According to the
projection made by the EIA, in 2020 technological progress will
increase United States domestic natural gas output by 2.5 trillion cubic
feet.69 The model calculates the expected effect of technological
DEMOCRACIES 166–69 (2010) (claiming that prospect theory and risk preferences apply
the same way to government as they apply to individuals).
69
Ted McCallister, Impact of Unconventional Gas Technology in the Annual Energy
Outlook 2000, ENERGY INFOR. ADMIN. 12–13 (2000), available at http://
webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/4265704/FID3754/pdf/m
ulti/uncongas.pdf. The methodology used in the estimation is based on profiling the
resources into undeveloped resources, proved resources (resources that “geological
and engineering data demonstrate with reasonable certainty to be recoverable in
future years from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating
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developments under 11 categories70 in accordance to the
developments that are projected in the field, and that may mature and
be implemented over the next several years. The model evaluates the
possible effect of each of these categories on the existing reserves and
on the industry’s ability to turn undeveloped resources into proved
resources, and proved resources into resources “in-play.”
Development and drilling technologies have the greatest expected
impact on the future production of natural gas—increasing output by
11.4 trillion cubic feet.71 Meanwhile, technological developments in
the exploration phase are expected to increase output by 5.7 trillion
cubic feet,72 and technological developments in the production phase
are estimated to increase output by 9.2 trillion cubic feet.73
It is illuminating to compare the projections of increased
production from technological advancement made in 2000 to the
actual output in recent years. In 2007 the actual unconventional gas
production was lower than projected: approximately 4 trillion cubic
feet74 in comparison to the estimated 5.1.75 By 2008 the gap had
disappeared—the forecast and the actual output were fairly close: the
former 5.1 trillion cubic feet76 and the latter 4.9.77 From 2009 onwards,
conditions,”) and resources which are “in play.” Id. at 3. The technological
developments are comprised of eleven categories that encompass the full spectrum of
key disciplines: geology, engineering, operations and the environment and affect
exploration, development of wells, and production. The following categories affect
exploration efficiency: basin assessments; play-specific extended reservoir
characterization, advanced exploration and natural fracture detection R & D. The
following categories affect well-development efficiency: geology/technology modeling
and matching, more effective lower damage well completion and simulation
technology, targeted drilling and hydraulic fracturing R & D and advanced well
completion technologies such as cavitation, horizontal drilling, and multilateral wells.
The following categories affect production efficiency: advanced well performance
diagnostics and remediation, new practices and technology for gas and water
treatment, other unconventional gas technologies such as enhanced gas shale recovery
using nitrogen or carbon dioxide injection, mitigation of environmental and other
constraints on development. Id. at 3–4.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 9.
72
Id. at 6.
73
Id. at 12.
74
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL GAS ANNUAL 2011, at 9 (2011), available at
http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/annual/pdf/nga11.pdf [hereinafter NATURAL GAS
ANNUAL 2011]. The total above for the actual unconventional natural production was
derived by adding the amount produced from coalbed wells (1.99 trillion cubic feet)
to the amount produced from shale gas wells (1.99 trillion cubic feet). Id.
75
McCallister, supra note 69, at 13.
76
Id.
77
NATURAL GAS ANNUAL 2011, supra note 74. Production from coalbed wells stood
at 2.022 trillion cubic feet and shale gas wells produced 2.87 cubic feet of natural gas.
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a reverse gap has developed in which actual output substantially
exceeds the projection. In 2009 the actual unconventional gas
production reached 6 trillion cubic feet in comparison to the
projected 5.15 trillion cubic feet.78 In 2011 the actual unconventional
gas production grew to an astonishing 10.3 trillion cubic feet,79 not only
exceeding the projection for 2011 by approximately 5.3 trillion cubic
feet, but exceeding even the projection for 2020 which was 7.5 trillion
cubic feet.80 In short, not only did past projections of technological
development not exaggerate the impact of technological development
on output, but they have even greatly underestimated the increased
capacity over time, especially after several years.
Needless to say, current projections for unconventional gas
production, on which technological developments have the greatest
impact, increased significantly from the estimations made in 2000.
The current estimate for natural gas production from unconventional
sources in 2020 has more than doubled, from the 7.2 trillion cubic feet
estimated in 2000 to 17.7 trillion cubic feet estimated in 2012.81 In
2035, natural gas production from unconventional sources is projected
to reach an astonishing level of 21.5 trillion cubic feet.82 This increase
is mostly due to the growth rate in the production of shale gas,
projected to increase an average of 4.1% per year between 2010 and
2035.83
It should be noted that the increase in the expected output due
to technological developments is not proportionate to the expected
increase in producers’ revenue streams. Revenue is expected to rise at
a much slower pace because the technological developments are
expected to decrease energy prices. According to the national
modeling energy system, the technological developments in the
exploration phase are expected to decrease the wellhead price of a
thousand cubic feet of natural gas by 17 cents in 2020 compared to a
scenario with no technological developments.84 In the case of the

Id.
78

McCallister, supra note 69, at 13.
NATURAL GAS ANNUAL 2011, supra note 74. Production from coalbed wells
amounted to 1.78 trillion cubic feet and production from shale gas wells amounted to
8.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Id.
80
McCallister, supra note 69, at 13.
81
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, at 159 (2012),
available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383 (2012).pdf.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
McCallister, supra note 69, at 6, 20 (projected price with technological
advancement is $2.81, and without is $2.98).
79
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development and drilling phase, they are expected to decrease the
price by 33 cents and in the production phase by 23 cents.85 Assuming
the technological development takes place in all phases, the wellhead
price of a thousand of cubic feet of gas is estimated to be 78 cents lower
than under a scenario in which no technological development takes
place.86
Graph 387
Projected Effect of All Unconventional Gas
Technologies on Unconventional Gas Production
1998–2020

Graph 3

The significant and ongoing effects of technological progress on
the cost involved in the production of natural resources are not
restricted to the natural gas industry, but also pertain to oil production,
especially from off-shore sources.88 Fagan found an 18% annual
85

Id. at 12, 20 (projected price with technological advancement is $2.81, and
without development and enhanced drilling technology is $3.14, and without
production enhanced technology is $3.04).
86
Id. at 13, 20 (projected price with technological advancement is $2.81, and
without is $2.03).
87
AEO 2000 NATIONAL ENERGY MODELING SYSTEM, runs BASINS D060600A and
UGRT04.D051600A, graph available at http://www.sitterdrilling.com/docs/
DOE_gas_production_increases_by_use_of_technology_on_unconventional_shales.p
df, at 13 (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
88
Measurement of technological advancement is a prerequisite for exploring the
impact of technological advancement on the costs of exploration, development, and
production of natural resources. Often, this involves using the expenditures on R&D
as a proxy for technological advancement. See, e.g., Zvi Grilliches, Productivity, R&D
and Basic Research at the Firm Level in the 1970’s, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 92 (1986). The
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decrease in costs in the off-shore oil industry between the years 1977
and 1994, more than offsetting the increase in costs due to depletion,
which was assessed to have climbed to an annual rate of 12% in the
same period.89 Forbes and Zampelli examined the success rate of gas
and oil explorations that had a direct impact on the costs per unit
between 1981 and 1995 in the Gulf of Mexico. They found an
extraordinary 8.3% annual growth in success rate between 1985 and
1995.90 Furthermore, Managi, Opaluch, Jin, and Grigalunas found a
constant increase in the gross total factor productivity (TFP) in the
production of gas and oil in the Gulf of Mexico in the 49 years between
1948 and 1997, averaging an annual increase of 1.2%.91 As they note,92
this rate is significantly higher than the general increase of the gross
TFP in the economy estimated by Färe, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang.93
In a subsequent study, Managi, Opaluch, and Grigalunas analyzed the
effect of technology on costs in the exploration phase. They used the
assumption that there is a direct link between one’s investment in technology and the
technological output has been much contested. See Zvi Grilliches, Productivity R&D
and the Data Constraint, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1994). The second method is to use
patent counts as a proxy for technological advancements. See J. Schmookler, The Level
of Inventive Activity, 36 REV. ECON. STAT. 183 (1954). This method was refined in order
to account for the variance in the commercial applicability of different patents by
counting citations to a patent. See B.H. Hall, A.B. Jaffe & M. Trajtenberg, The NBER
Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools, (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf. A third method, concentrating on the
petroleum industry, was developed by Cuddington & Moss, accounting for the
diffusion of technology in the market by constructing an index counting reports on
technological innovation in the industry’s trade journals. J.T. Cuddington & D.L.
Moss, Technological Change, Depletion and the U.S. Petroleum Industry: A New Approach to
Measurement and Estimation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1135 (2001).
89
M.N. Fagan, Resource Depletion and Technical Change: Effects on U.S. Crude Oil
Findings Costs from 1977 to 1994, 18 ENERGY J. 91, 98 (1997).
90
K.F. Forbes & E. M. Zampelli, Technology and the Exploratory Success Rate in the U.S.
Offshore, 21 ENERGY J. 109, 118–19 (2000).
91
S. Managi, J.J. Opaluch, D. Jin & T.A. Grigalunas, Technological Change and
Depletion in Offshore Oil and Gas, 47 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 388, 403 (2004). Their
central finding that the net TFP is a U-shaped curve is not of interest to this Article.
The net TFP takes into account the depletion of resources, and the depletion of
resources is of no concern to this Article. The point of this paper is that the costs for
a given resource decrease overtime due to technological developments. The deadweight
loss of a tax that eliminates the exploitation of a resource in the present is lower than
perceived because there is a strong likelihood that in the future the same resource will
be utilized due to the technological improvements that will lead to lower costs. The
gross TFP and not the net TFP is of relevance for the measurement of future estimated
costs of certain resources.
92
Id.
93
R. Färe, S. Grosskopf, M. Norris & Z. Zhang, Productivity Growth, Technical
Progress and Efficiency Change in Industrialized Countries, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 66, 80–81
(1994).
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data from of the Joint Association Survey on Drilling Costs published
by the American Petroleum Institute regarding offshore drilling costs
between 1955 and 1996. They found that technology also had a
significant impact on reducing the costs of the exploration phase.94
The conclusion that emerges from the studies above is that there
is a very strong expectancy that technological advancements in the
future will decrease the costs of exploration, development, and
production of natural resources, especially oil and natural gas in
offshore drilling. This probability should have a significant impact on
the design of taxes on natural resources, as the next Part will
demonstrate.
VI. IGNORING OPTION VALUE AND REAL OPTION VALUE
Considering the findings outlined above, why is option value so
often overlooked and ignored? Although a few studies have shown that
option value is often not taken into account in various fields of legal
policy, the cause of this omission still needs to be explained. This
Article aims to fill that gap by arguing that our tendency to overlook
option value stems from a wider phenomenon that has also received
attention in legal scholarship: a general tendency to focus on static
analysis, based on historical data, and a failure to detect dynamic
elements that change over time. A static analysis aims at adopting the
policy that will enhance social welfare given certain conditions. A
dynamic analysis takes into account how such a policy might itself
change those conditions over time, and thus how its effects might
substantially differ from those predicted by a static analysis. The
dynamic model exposes how the equilibrium that the static model
predicts is only a temporary equilibrium and thus not as significant as
the static model portrays.95
As it typically happens in the economic analysis of the law, the
relatively recent trend of focusing on dynamic analysis has mainly
originated from the field of antitrust law.96 David Evans and Keith
94

Shunsuke Managi, James J.Opaluch & Thomas A. Grigalunas, Technological
Change and Petroleum Exploration in the Gulf of Mexico, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 619, 629 (2005).
95
DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 508 (2012).
96
Antitrust scholarship has pioneered the way for general law and economics
analysis since its inception. In the conventional account of the historical development
of law and economics analysis, Aaron Director’s course in law and economics in the
1930’s at the University of Chicago Law School is seen as the origin of the law and
economics movement. As Harold Demsetz notes, only in the early 1960’s did “[t]he
interaction of law and economics burst beyond the narrower confines of the antitrust
area.” See Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and economics at
Chicago 1932–1970, 26 J. L. & ECON. 163, 191 (1983); see also Ejan Mackaay, History of
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Hylton were the first scholars to note the deficiency in most static
antitrust models, which overlooked important possible effects since
they did not admit a dynamic element.97 More specifically, Gregory
Sidak and David Teece argue that the static models of competition in
antitrust do not account for effects associated with competition such
as the introduction of new products, new features, and new pricing
methods.98 Joseph Harrington argues that under a dynamic model that
does not focus only on one time period, the penalty multiple required
to deter corporations from colluding is two to three times smaller in
size than in a static model.99 Judge Douglas Ginsburg and Professor
Joshua Wright pointed out that the need for incorporating dynamic
models into antitrust legal scholarship is broadly accepted among
scholars, and the main question now is how such incorporation should
take place.100
The need to incorporate dynamic analysis into the study of legal
institutions has permeated other fields—mainly environmental law,
but other legal fields as well. For example, David Dreisen emphasized
the need for environmental law to be based on dynamic models that
take into account changes in consumption patterns over time and the
effects of current policies on future innovation.101 Dreisen also
demonstrated how dynamic economic analysis could contribute to the
optimal management of infrastructural commons, including
environmental resources, by taking into account their evolution over
time.102
The cognitive error of conflating present value and option value
might also explain the neglect of option value: an erroneous inference
that an option for developing a project in the future is worthless
because it does not have positive economic value in the present. This
inference may be true under a static analysis, in which we assume there
Law and Economics, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 65, 72 (2000).
97
David Evans & Keith Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power
and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, 203, 240
(2008).
98
J. Gregory Sidak & David F. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 602 (2009).
99
Joseph Harrington, Who Should be the Target of Cartel Sanctions?: Comment on
Antitrust Sanctions, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 41, 44 (2010).
100
Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua Wright, Dynamic Analysis & the Limits of Antitrust
Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2 (2012).
101
David Driesen, Symposium: Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law and the Static
Efficiency: The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Emission
Trading and Priority-Setting, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 501, 507–09 (2004).
102
David Driesen, An Economic Dynamic Approach to the Infrastructure Commons, 35
ECOLOGY L. Q. 215, 217–19 (2008).
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are no grounds to believe that any of the exogenous circumstances
significant for the economic outcome will change in the future. Under
such an assumption the future value will not depart substantially from
the present value, hence an option to obtain the future outcome
cannot be of significant value: the difference in outcome will be
worthless in the future similarly to its present value. An option to
obtain a worthless outcome is worthless. In contrast, in cases in which
there are firm grounds to believe that in the future the circumstances
will change so that the project will have positive economic value, the
option value may substantially depart from the present value.
Generally, it might be true that there are no grounds to believe that
circumstances will change significantly in one way or the other. While
the value of the underlying asset may increase in the future, it may also
decrease. But as I have noted above, in the case of oil and gas, there
are good grounds to believe that a positive option value will emerge in
the future.
In addition to a standard cognitive error account, overlooking the
option value could be explained through the focusing illusion bias.
According to Schkade and Kahneman, the focusing illusion happens
“when a judgment about an entire object or category is made with
attention focused on a subset of that category . . . the attended subset
is overweighed relative to the unattended subset.”103 Wilson et al. have
extended the application of the focusing illusion to cases in which an
individual focuses on the occurrence in question, and fails to consider
the consequences of other events that are likely to occur.104 Wilson’s
description seems to fit perfectly with the case we are concerned with—
the consequences of a tax. The occurrence in question is the
economic effect of the tax. The evident and direct effect of the tax is
its distortionary effect—eliminating certain beneficial transactions that
would have taken place in a tax-free world. Scholars have focused on
this direct effect of taxation, but neglected to account for an additional
103

David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People
Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 340 (1998).
Schade & Kahneman demonstrate the focusing illusion through a famous experiment
in which they ask students from the Midwest and California questions regarding the
life satisfaction of a similar individual from the other region. Participants rated the
life satisfaction of Californians higher, although there was no difference in the selfreporting of life satisfaction of the students from the two regions. Schade and
Kahneman reasoned that climate-related aspects are an easily observed difference
between the regions and participants tended to focus on it (hence the focusing
illusion), although in reality climate does not actually have much impact on life
satisfaction.
104
Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821, 822 (2000).
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consequence: the option value the tax may generate by enabling an
economic activity to take place in the future. The phenomenon of the
focusing illusion is related to an additional phenomenon that could
explain the neglect of dynamic analysis in general: people’s tendency
to give disproportionate weight to accessible information and to focus
on what comes easily to mind.105 This can explain our tendency to
ignore the possibility of a dynamic model: a result of its complexity and
its concern with remote contingencies in time—information that
people tend to ignore.
The focus on costs when analyzing the effect of taxation is
reminiscent of a similar tendency in tort law. Professor William Bishop
has underscored how, counter-intuitively, the occurrence of a tort can
generate an economic benefit. The occurrence of a tort that causes an
economic harm, like loss of income to a business, may generate an
opportunity to benefit to its rivals.106 Bishop argues that that may be
the justification for excluding compensation in cases of economic
harms: as a rule of thumb, these torts do not necessarily cause social
cost—the revenue lost by one business may just end up in the hand of
its rivals.107 Due to the fact that such losses to third parties are not a
social cost, from the perspective of the tortfeasor’s optimal level of care
and level of activity it is not desirable that the tortfeasor will internalize
such consequences. The example Bishop discusses is of a train
accident that causes the citizens of town A to move to town B due to a
leakage of poisonous substances, and as a result, the businesses of town
A lose all their revenue.108 In such a case, the harm to the businesses
of town A is not necessarily a social cost, due to a possible shift of
business to town B, and thus should not be internalized through the
tort system.109

105

See Norbert Schwartz, Feelings as Information: Informational and Motivational
Functions of Affective States, in 2 HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION 527 (R.
Sorrrentino & E.T. Higgins eds., 1990); E.T. Higgins, Knowledge Activation: Accessibility,
Applicability and Salience, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 133
(E.T. Higgins & A. Kruglanski eds., 1996).
106
W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL S. 1, 3 (1982).
107
Id. at 4–7 (assuming the costs for the rival business are similar to those of the
harmed business—that marginal costs do not increase with scale).
108
Id. at 5–6.
109
The most striking counterintuitive implication of Bishop’s analysis is his
assertion that, in the circumstances he analyzes, the moral hazard of insurance does
not generate a social cost. Even if a business loses revenue due to its own reckless
behavior, as long as there are other businesses that could profit from that loss without
higher costs than that of the initial business, this reckless behavior does not generate
any social cost. See id. at 9–10.
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Similar to Bishop’s observations regarding the possible positive
consequences of a tort that should be taken into account, this Article
points out the possible side-benefits of a tax. Both torts and taxation
are perceived as representing negative events; their consequences are
comprised primarily of costs. Although this is generally true, in both
cases this perception may cause us to overlook possible side-benefits,
such as the emerging business opportunities for third parties as a
consequence of economic harm in the case of torts, and the option
value for future exploration with lower costs in the case of taxation of
natural resources. In both cases there is still a net social cost, but taking
into account the side-benefits may have a substantial effect on policy—
excluding compensation for economic harm in the case of torts and
increasing the tax rate in the case of taxation on natural resources.
Although Bishop did not address any cognitive biases in his article,
Kahneman’s110 and Wilson’s111 cognitive analyses can provide a unified
explanation of why both the point Bishop illuminates, as well as the
option value of taxes discussed in this article, have been overlooked.
VII. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
A. Option Value of Present Exploration
In this Article I have presented the option value that may be
generated by not exploiting the field in the present. Even if one
accepts this conclusion, taking into account real option value might
not necessarily decrease the deadweight of taxation as claimed in this
Article, and might actually increase it. Real option value might also be
generated by the exploitation of a field, and not only from nonexploitation. For example, the exploitation of a field might also open
valuable options that wouldn’t have existed if the field had not been
exploited. These additional options that emerged by exploitation
might add substantial value to the exploitation of the field, in addition
to the market value of the resource itself. The additional resources
might turn a country into a resource independent country, and thus
have a significant impact on its foreign policy and role in world trade.112
110

See supra note 103.
See supra note 104.
112
Regarding economic benefits of energy independence as a significant
consideration for energy policy, see Randolph Comstock, FUA: The Transition to
Alternative Fuels in the Industrial and Electric Utility Sectors, 29 KAN. L. REV. 337, 364 (1981).
Regarding the effect of energy dependence on the U.S. foreign affairs policy, see James
Woolsey & Anne Korin, Turning Oil into Salt, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 25, 2007),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/222256/turning-oil-salt-r-james-woolseyanne-korin. For reference to the benefits of energy independence in both the
111
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In addition, the resources produced may tilt a country over a tipping
point that has a significant impact on the state such as scale advantages
that enable the country to decrease costs of production in its region.113
Last but not least, the exploitation itself might generate new drilling
technology, by conveying significant information on the connection
between the geologic structures in the area exploited and the
likelihood of finding natural resources in such structures. This option
value of exploitation may be generated even in case of failure to
produce natural resources from the field.114
An empirically supported source of the option value of
exploitation is the option to sell oil and gas at current prices—an
option that only extraction enables firms to execute.115 There are
reasonable grounds supported by data for the claim that the option to
sell under current prices is of significantly higher value than the option
to sell under future prices. It has already been noted that a side effect
of technological advancements is a decrease in the price of the natural
resource: the greater productivity increases the supply and reduces the
price. That effect alone is not necessarily sufficient to offset the
positive option value of technological development;116 an additional
source for an expected decrease in future prices is a projected decline
in the demand for natural resources, especially fossil fuels, due to
substitute goods such as solar energy and greater productivity in the
use of natural resources.117
economic sphere and the foreign policy sphere, see Ariel Cohen,, Ukraine’s Economic
Benefits from Integration into the Euro-Atlantic Community, HERITAGE.ORG (June 12, 2007),
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/ukraines-economic-benefitsfrom-integration-into-the-euro-atlantic-community.
113
For an example of a similar “tipping point” effect, see Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew
Warner, The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth, 59 J. DEVELOPMENT ECON. 43,
43–44 (1999).
114
See Alwyn Young, Invention and Bounded Learning by Doing, 101 J. POL. ECON. 443
(1993) (discussing experience as a significant factor for advancing technology).
115
It is possible to some extent to receive a price close to current prices for future
production by obtaining a put option. Yet if it is common knowledge that there is a
strong probability that prices will decrease, the put option will more likely reflect the
lower prices than the current high prices.
116
See McCallister, supra note 69, at 6, 12, 20.
117
It is instructive to note that under certain circumstances the greater productivity
of natural resources such as fossil fuels might increase consumption, a phenomenon
labeled in the scholarship as the “rebound effect.” The greater productivity reduces
the quantity of natural resources needed for a given purpose, reducing the price of
the activity for which the natural resource is used and thus increasing the overall
consumption of the natural resource. The classic example of the rebound effect is the
case of car usage of fuel. The enhanced fuel efficiency of cars, increasing the miles
per gallon ratio, reduces the per-mile price of driving and thus may increase the
amount of mileage driven and increase the overall consumption of oil. For a
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Overall, there are many possible sources for option value in the
reverse direction from the one suggested in this Article—option value
that stems from the exploitation of resource fields. Taking into
account such options will alter significantly the analysis provided in this
Article.
There are two ways of presenting this objection to the Article’s
argument: a strong version and a weak one. The strong version raises
questions regarding the general methodology of a dynamic model that
incorporates option value into the economic analysis of deadweight
loss: that option value might tilt the balance in both directions. The
fact that there are endless scenarios for how option value might be
generated just reflects how messy a dynamic analysis that takes option
value into account can be, and raises the question of whether this
analysis can actually lead to fruitful results.
The weak version of this objection does not question the general
dynamic analysis methodology, but only the specific conclusion that
taking option value into account decreases the deadweight loss of the
tax on natural resources and justifies increasing the tax rate. The
possibilities mentioned above demonstrate that it is possible that the
option value may actually increase the deadweight loss of taxation due
to non-exploitation. According to the weak-version objection, there is
no fundamental methodological problem with a dynamic analysis of
deadweight loss that takes real option value into account; the problem
is only that this Article’s proposed model is too limited and does not
fully incorporate real-world option value into its analysis. It cherrypicks the option value of non-exploitation while pushing aside the
option value that may accompany exploitation.
While the strong version of this objection is ultimately
unpersuasive, the weaker version raises important questions that
should prompt further research. Simply put, the strong version
objection, which calls for a wholesale rejection of the dynamic analysis
methodology employed in this Article, is itself too simplistic. The fact
that the dynamic analysis called for in this Article is fairly complex, and
has to consider a vast amount of possible sources of option value
working in different directions, is not a reason to abandon it. If one
admits that taking option value into account may have a significant
impact on the analysis of taxation’s deadweight loss, one simply has to
attempt to take it into account, no matter how complex the analysis.
To paraphrase the saying mostly attributed to Maynard Keynes118 and
discussion of the rebound effect, see Kenneth A. Small & Kurt Van Dender, Fuel
Efficiency and Motor Vehicle Travel: The Declining Rebound Effect, 28 ENERGY J. 25 (2007).
118
ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 20 (2010).
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Amartya Sen,119 but originally phrased by the philosopher Carveth
Read, it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong.120
The softer version of the objection above raises more serious
concerns. One could not object to the possibility that option value may
be generated through exploitation as well as through abstention. The
indications for option value stemming from exploitation, however, are
not as strong as the indications for option value stemming from nonexploitation.
There are many studies regarding technological
advancements in the natural resources sector, and the projection that
such advancements will continue in the future is widely accepted.121 In
contrast, there are not many studies regarding most of the sources for
option value stemming from field exploration. There are some studies
showing the technological experience gained by exploration—
”learning by doing.”122 While there are studies that assert that future
natural resources prices, especially natural gas and oil, will decline,
these assertions are highly contestable among scholars.123
The analysis in this Article, however, does not pretend to be
exhaustive. It only presents the basic model for such an analysis. It is
also very likely that even if the general framework presented in this
Article is correct and the data on which it relies is not, there may be
certain cases with unique attributes124 in which the option value of
exploitation is greater than the option value of non-exploitation. In
short, the analysis presented here should provide a platform for
further scholarship and research that takes into account the
complexity of dynamic economic analysis of taxation in general and
the taxation of natural resources in particular.
B. Is there Actually a Deadweight Loss in the Taxation of Oil and Gas?
This Article is premised on the assumption that taxation of oil and
gas is necessarily accompanied by deadweight loss. I have argued that
119

LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 24
(2002).
120
CARVETH READ, LOGIC, DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE 272 (1898).
121
See supra notes 89–91, 94.
122
See Young, supra note 114.
123
According to the basic economic model and the Hotelling Rule, prices of
natural resources are projected to increase, see Hotelling, supra note 56. For
reinforcement of the classic view in the case of fossil fuels, see McCallister, supra note
69, at 10, 12. In contrast, Vincent, Panayotou & Hartwick project that in the long-run
prices will decrease. See Jeffrey Vincent, Teodore Panayotou & John M. Hartwick,
Resource Depletion and Sustainability in Small Open Economies, 33 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
274, 282 (1997); see also Peter Berck & Michael Roberts, Natural Resources Prices: Will
They Ever Turn Up?, 31 J. ENTVL. ECON. & MGMT. 65, 77 (1996).
124
See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text.
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given that deadweight loss is a key factor in determining a tax rate,
incorporating option value has a significant effect on deadweight loss
and as a result also has a significant effect on the optimal tax rate on
oil and gas. The existence of the deadweight effect in the exploration
and production of natural resources in general and oil and gas in
particular is questionable, both on the empirical level and the
theoretical level. On the empirical level, most of the exploration,
development, and production of oil and gas is conducted by large
multi-national firms that pursue many similar projects
simultaneously.125 As a result, even if a firm loses money in a specific
location because, for example, exploration there does not lead to any
results, it could deduct those losses from the profits on its other
projects. Thus, in essence, the firm does not incur the full costs of the
failed exploration. The deductibility of the loss from its other profits
is equivalent to a partial reimbursement for its investment from the
government, equaling the tax rate on its profits.
If the government incurs a share in the losses equivalent to the
share it collects through taxation, the firm’s decision whether to invest
is not distorted by taxation. The ratio between the firm’s expected
gains and its expected losses is identical in both a world with no taxes
and in a world with taxes. Assume that its expected pre-tax revenues if
the exploration is fruitful are P*X, and its expected losses if the
exploration fails are (1-P)*Y. Given that the firm will be reimbursed
for its losses at a rate that equals the tax rate on its gains, the post-tax
125

The biggest American gas and oil company, Exxon Mobil Corp (total asset value
of $345 billion), drilled 1,163 wells in the U.S. during 2012 alone. Chevron (the
second biggest U.S. oil and gas company with a total asset value of $233 billion) drilled
951 wells, and Conoco Philips (the third biggest with a total asset value of $117 billion)
drilled 492 wells. The company that had drilled the most is Occidental Petroleum
Corporation (the fourth biggest U.S. oil and gas company with a total asset value of
$64 billion dollars), which drilled 1,411 wells during 2012. The phenomenon of
drilling numerous wells is not limited to these conglomerates. Even companies bellow
the top 50 biggest companies drill tens of wells in a given year, such as Clayton Williams
Energy Inc., the 63rd biggest with 97 wells, Fidelity Exploration & Production Co. the
64th biggest with 67 wells, and Roseta Resources Inc. the 65th biggest with 82 wells.
The biggest 150 oil and gas companies drilled 18,598 wells in the U.S. during 2012,
averaging 124 wells per company. For full information regarding the activity of the
150 biggest oil and gas companies, see Conglin Xu & Laura Bell, OGJ 150 Earnings
Down as US Production Climbs, 111 J. GAS & OIL 34, 46–51 (2013). Exxon Mobil Corp.
is only the fourteenth both in the share of worldwide oil reserves it holds (0.7%) and
in its share of worldwide natural gas (0.65%). See American Petroleum Institute,
Putting
Earnings
Into
Perspective,
at
4
(Dec.
2013),
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20140327140452/ http://api.org/oil-and-natural-gasoverview/industry-economics/~/media/Files/Statistics/Earnings-Perspective/
earnings-perspective-low-res.ashx (accessed by using the Way Back Machine to view the
older version of this website).
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ratio of its expected gains and losses will equal the pre-tax ratio of its
expected gains and losses:
(1-P)*Y*(1-T) : P*X*(1-T) = (1-P)*Y : P*X
In the equation above, it is evident that the ratios of the pre-tax
expected gains and losses (on the right side of the equation) equal
those of the post-tax expected gains and losses (on the left hand of the
equation)—both the numerator and the denominator are multiplied
by the same factor—(1-t)—the firm’s post-tax share of both losses and
gains.
The fact that the ratio of the expected profits and losses is
constant in both a pre-tax world and in a post-tax world essentially
means that taxes do not distort the firm’s decision to invest in
exploring a certain field. The firm’s decision is based on whether the
expected gains are lower or higher than the expected losses:
P*X >≤ (1-P)*Y
The sign will not change after both sides of the equation are multiplied
by the same factor—(1-T):
>
P*X *(1-T) ≤ (1-P)*Y*(1-T)
This means that imposing a tax will not alter the firm’s decision
whether or not to invest in a certain field. The relationship between
the two sides of the equation and the decision over whether to invest
in production are not affected by the tax rate, or by whether there is
any tax imposed.
This in and of itself does not necessarily make the argument
presented in this Article superfluous. There may be cases in which
there will be no deadweight loss, because a firm with substantial profits
will not incur the full loss of an exploration but will only lose the
fraction of post-tax profits they receive from the gross profits. Yet there
are still many other cases in which a firm does not have any profits it
could use for deducting its future losses. Such a scenario is likely to
happen when there is a sudden drop in energy prices. This objection
may limit the scope of the argument in the paper, but does not
undermine it.
Even if in reality there might be many firms without profits from
other sources, meaning that their decisions will be distorted by taxes,
there is a theoretical challenge facing the application of real option
value to such cases. If a refundable negative tax were provided to such
firms, their decision whether or not to invest also would not have been
distorted by taxes. Under such a regime, there would not be any case
in which a decision of the firm over whether to invest would be
distorted by taxes, and thus there would not be any case in which there
is a deadweight loss as a result of taxation of natural resources. Such a
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regime, with strong support on the theoretical level, would make the
argument presented in this Article futile: there would not be any
deadweight loss from taxation of natural resources or any need to
reassess it by taking into account option value.
I admit that such a regime has a strong justification in theory, but
in practice it does not exist in almost any country, including the U.S.126
Scholars have provided different explanations for why such a regime
does not exist, from political economy explanations to administrative
explanations.127 What matters is that at the end of the day the
deadweight effect of taxes on natural resources is still with us and is
here to stay, so at least it should be assessed properly.
C. Missing the Technological Development Target
The conclusion of this Article is premised on assessments
regarding technological developments in exploration, development,
and production in the gas and oil sectors. Although these assessments
are the best available in the industry, they are still assessments, and
their projections may turn out to be erroneous. If the policy suggested
by this Article is adopted, certain fields may still not be exploited
because the actual cost reduction is not, in fact, large enough to offset
the increased tax rate. Furthermore, the price of the natural resources
in question might decrease and reduce the profitability of producing
those natural resources even if the expected technological
development materializes. Assuming that under such circumstances
the option value has diminished significantly, the increased tax rate
would generate a significant deadweight loss. Although the question
of error costs is relevant to any policy, the question is especially relevant
to a policy such as the one suggested in this Article. Policies that
mainly rely on speculation regarding future trends have an especially
126

In the U.S., § 172 of the I.R.C. permits taxpayers to carry losses back three years
and carry losses forward fifteen years, but in order for the losses to be of any use to the
taxpayer they have to be accompanied by gains. The tax court suggested in Alprosa
Watch Corp. v. Commissioner that the U.S. should permit a refundable credit for losses
even without incurring gains in any time frame. 11 T.C. 240 (1948). For an argument
for accepting such a mechanism, see Mark Campisano & Roberta Romano, Recouping
Losses: The Case for Full Loss Offsets, 76 NW. L. REV. 709, 709–10 (1982).
127
Regarding the administrative cost of burdening the treasury to pay out refunds
to businesses, see Campisano & Romano, supra note 126, at 741. Campisano and
Romano claim that that is one of the central justifications for preferring free
transferability of losses (enabling firms with losses to sell their losses to firms with
gains) over a refundable credit. Regarding political economy explanations for the
current system that does not permit a refundable credit for losses, see Mark Campisano
& Roberta Romano, On the Benefits of Loss Recoupment: A Response, 21 TAX NOTES 209,
211 (1983) (arguing that practitioners have a strong interest in maintaining the
current complex system of loss carry back and carry forward).
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high chance of erring.
On the face of it there seems to be a simple solution: it is always
possible to decrease the tax rate and mitigate the costs if predictions
turn out to be incorrect. It is important to understand, however, the
significant costs that accompany such reductions of the tax rate. In his
book on the subject, Professor Daniel Shaviro emphasizes the
substantial costs that are involved with legal transitions in general, and
transitions in the tax system in particular. The instability generated by
changes in the tax system is a substantial cost of such changes.128 Adam
Smith has expressed this view through the maxim that the only good
tax is an old tax.129 A transition to reduce a tax might be even worse
than a transition to impose or increase a tax. From an efficiency
perspective, a transition in which a tax is imposed retroactively may
enhance efficiency—it enables the government to collect taxes without
the price of deadweight loss, and it does not distort the individual’s
decision making because it applies to a decision he has made in the
past.130 The reverse is true for a transition in which the tax rate is
decreased: society incurred the cost of the deadweight loss without
reaping the benefit of collecting taxes. Firms have made decisions
under the assumption that a high tax rate would apply and as a
consequence reduced exploration and production, but eventually paid
only a low-rate tax.
This is the caveat to the policy suggested in this Article—dynamic
analysis is complex and should involve the best possible application of
empirical data. There is always a significant chance that even the bestinformed predictions will turn out to be false. Although it is always
possible to mitigate such a mistake by decreasing the tax rate, the costs
of such transitions are significant. Thus, the treatment of changes in
the tax rate based on projections should be analyzed cautiously before
implemented, even though it seems that one could always roll back to
the previous tax rate.

128

DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF
TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 2–3 (2000). It should be noted that in his book
Shaviro also highlights that in some cases the transition costs are inflated: he
distinguishes the transition risk effect which should not raise any efficiency concerns
and the retroactive tax effect which should. See id. at 5–7.
129
Id. at 3 (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 457 (1976 ed.)).
130
See Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence Kotlikoff, Investment Versus Savings Incentives:
The Size of the Bang for the Buck and the Potential for Self-Financing Business Tax Cuts, in
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT DEFICITS 121 (Laurence Meyer ed.,
1983); Shaviro, supra note 128.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article opens with a quotation from Robert Frost’s poem, The
Road not Taken: “And both that morning equally lay / In leaves no step had
trodden black / Oh, I kept the first for another day!”131 These verses serve as
a preamble to the central theme in the Article—that by imposing a
high tax rate we might essentially be keeping an option for another
day, and this option that is not taken into account may have
considerable value. But the next verses of the poem reveal a concern
about leaving a path for another day: “Yet knowing how way leads on to
way / I doubted if I should ever come back.”132 We may never, in fact, exploit
the fields put off for the future—our predictions, no matter how
carefully formulated, may turn out wrong.
This Article aims at substantiating the claim that even if a high tax
rate does not enable exploring and developing a field in the present,
there is still a strong likelihood it will be developed in the future under
the same tax rate. The reason for this is the constant technological
advancements in the gas and oil sectors that should reduce costs over
time. The central argument of this Article applies to taxation in
general: the estimated deadweight loss of taxation may be lower than
the conventional assessment due to the neglect of the option value that
accompanies a tax. Taking into account the neglected option value
may imply that the optimal tax rate should be higher than the current
rate. The Article has focused on taxation of gas and oil since
substantiating the option value in that sector is fairly easy; yet in
principle, this argument could be relevant to other taxes in which
there is a substantial option value that is generated by postponing
present economic activity. This argument has significant fiscal
implications for tax policy: the volume of oil and gas taxes in the U.S.
should be much larger.
Even if this forecast is erroneous, and the technological
advancements would not be sufficient for exploring new gas and oil
resources under the higher tax rate, it is always possible to “roll back”
to the prior development path by decreasing the tax rate. This is one
of the major sources of the real option value—it leaves different
courses of action open, so even if the prospects one has based his
actions on have not materialized, one can hedge such a loss by going
back and taking the other path that has been left open. Even though
changing the tax rate may be accompanied by substantial costs, it still
enables us to hedge the decision appropriately.
131
132

ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, in MOUNTAIN INTERVAL 9 (1916).
Id.
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The argument made in this Article is based on a wider claim,
gaining traction in legal scholarship, that economic models of law may
overlook significant dynamic elements that may have a substantial
impact on the analysis. Integrating these dynamic elements may
enable us to capture the effects of policy choices over time. Dynamic
models are inevitably more complex, but without taking into account
this complexity the conclusions of the economic analysis are likely to
be erroneous. To paraphrase Carveth Read, it is better to be roughly
right than precisely wrong.133

133

See supra note 120.

